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Abstract Many European countries restrict immigration from new EU member
countries. The rationale is to avoid adverse wage and employment effects. We
quantify these effects for Germany. Following Borjas (in Q J Econ
CXVIII(4):1335–1374, 2003), we estimate a structural model of labor demand,
based on elasticities of substitution between workers with different experience
levels and education. We allow for unemployment which we model in a price-wage-
setting framework. Simulating a counterfactual scenario without restrictions for
migration from new EU members countries in Germany, we find moderate negative
wage and employment effects for incumbent foreigners, but positive effects for
natives. Our results indicate that for the native German population as a whole the
immigration restrictions are not welfare enhancing.
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1 Introduction
The treaties governing the entry of 12 Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) into the European Union enable incumbent member states to maintain
their immigration restrictions vis-a`-vis new members for a maximum of 7 years.1
The majority of countries have opted for such transitional restrictions. In 2004, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden were the only exceptions, and when Bulgaria
and Romania became members in 2007, the UK and Ireland too have joined the
countries invoking the transitional agreement. Germany, the largest and closest
country to those new members, has been particularly strict and, like Austria, intends
to extend restrictions until the year 2011.
What is the economic rationale for transitional restrictions? Policy makers in
Germany and elsewhere fear a large inflow of workers from accession countries and
seem to expect rising native unemployment and lower wages. But what is the
empirical support for this presumption? Would native workers on average suffer
from immigration from the accession countries? If so, by how much? Which types
of workers would gain, which would lose? Could the labor inflow give rise to a
native welfare gain on the aggregate level?2
In this paper we give tentative answers to these questions, proceeding in two
steps. First, we estimate a set of disaggregate labor demand elasticities that
determine whether immigrant and native workers are substitutes or complements in
general equilibrium, as well as wage-setting equations that characterize labor
market institutions responsible for unemployment. In a second step, we then use
these elasticities in order to numerically simulate a counterfactual scenario where
Germany would have abstained from the aforementioned transitional immigration
restrictions. We compute employment and wage effects, as well as overall welfare
effects, thus quantifying the pains and gains foregone by invoking the transition
agreement.
We follow Borjas (2003) in specifying a system of labor demand functions
disaggregated by levels of education and work experience. Using wage and
employment data for natives and immigrants from German household survey data,
we estimate elasticities of substitution that govern labor demand, allowing for
imperfect substitution between native foreign workers.3 Our contribution is to
extend this approach by incorporating wage-setting equations along the lines
suggested by Layard et al. (2005). This allows us to allow for equilibrium
unemployment in our numerical simulation, which is crucial in the European
1 On May 1st of 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estland, Hungary, Latvia, Lituania, Malta, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia have joined the EU. Bulgaria and Romania have followed on January 1st
of 2007.
2 This is the so-called immigration surplus; see Borjas (1999). For a general treatment see Felbermayr
and Kohler (2007).
3 More recent applications of this approach to the US and Canada are found in Ottaviano and Peri (2006,
2008) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007). An alternative approach, mainly followed in earlier literature, is to
focus on evidence across regions receiving different inflows of foreign workers. A well known study is
Card (1990) who uses the natural experiment provided by a strong but short-lived inflow of Cubans into
Miami; see Card (2009) for a recent survey. For a general survey, see Hanson (2008).
2 G. Felbermayr et al.
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context. For our counterfactual scenario, we utilize information on the recent flows
of workers from accession countries into the UK, in order to proxy the size and
educational composition of the additional immigration that Germany would have
received under free movement without transitional restrictions.
Our paper is closely related to D’Amuri et al. (2009) and Bru¨cker and Jahn
(2008), but it features key differences in terms of the data used and the empirical
strategy employed to model labor market imperfections. Importantly, it focuses on a
special policy scenario which is motivated against the backdrop of eastern EU
enlargement.4 Our results indicate that in the long run these restrictions have a
negative effect on native workers and on overall welfare of native-German factor
owners. The only group that profits from the transitional restrictions are incumbent
foreigners. In the short run we find a negative, but very small effect on native
workers. Hence, it appears difficult to rationalize the use of transitional restrictions
in Germany on grounds of political economy.
Section 2 explains the theoretical background and estimation framework. It also
describes the data and presents key estimation results. Section 3 uses these results to
simulate our counterfactual scenario, focusing on how wages and employment of
natives as well as foreign workers would have evolved had Germany not imposed
transitional restrictions. We also present calculations for forgone welfare effects of
natives. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework and estimation
Our framework follows Borjas (2003) who attempts to measure the wage effects of
immigration for the US, assuming full employment. In applying the approach to
Germany, we want to allow for unemployment. The basic idea is that for any type of
labor employment is subject to the condition that the marginal value productivity is
equal to the ongoing wage rate. Our first step thus involves estimation of inverse
labor demand functions for different types of labor characterized by levels of
education and experience. However, a fundamental premise of our approach is that
labor markets are non-Walrasian in that institutional wage-setting generates
unemployment. We stipulate that the wage-setting process takes into account the
degree of unemployment within and across education 9 experience-segments of the
labor market. We thus derive estimation equations from the paradigm of ‘‘price-
wage-setting’’ that has been proposed by Layard et al. (2005) in order to understand
European unemployment. The estimated wage-setting elasticities may then be
combined with the estimated labor demand parameters in order to simulate the wage
and employment effects of immigration. We restrict the following presentation of
our estimation framework to the bare essentials; more details may be found in
Felbermayr et al. (2008).5
4 The working paper versions of all three studies came out at around the same time; see Felbermayr et al.
(2008).
5 A revised version of that paper is available upon request.
Restrictive immigration policy in Germany 3
123
2.1 A structural model of labor demand
Suppose Lex
N and Lex
M denotes aggregate employment of native and migrant workers,
respectively, with education-level e (e = 1,…, E) and experience level x
(x = 1,…, X). From the first-order condition for profit maximization, wages wNex
and wex
M must satisfy
ln wNtex=w
M
tex
  ¼  1
rMe
ln LNtex=L
M
tex
 þ DNtex þ utex; ð1Þ
where re
M denotes the elasticity of substitution between natives and migrants, which
is assumed constant across x but allowed to vary across e. We have also added a
time index and an error term utex. This equation may be estimated using variation
across e, x and t. The term Dtex
N represents a collection of fixed effects, whereby we
assume Dtex = dex ? det ? dxt. Intuitively, for each e 9 x-segment of the labor
market, native and foreign workers combine to generate an aggregate labor input
Lex. Notice that for a constant marginal value productivity of Lex, we have
d ln wNex ¼ sMex=rMe
 
d ln LMex, where sex
M is the share of immigrant wage payments in
the overall payments for Lex. This describes complementarity between native
workers and migrants within the e 9 x-segment of the labor market. Note that sex
M
re
M [ 0 if re
M is finite.6 Assuming CES production technology, we may use the
estimate D^tex to recover the CES share parameter associated with native labor
according to k^Ntex ¼ 1  kMex
  ¼ exp D^tex
 
1 þ exp D^tex
  1
. Using the estimates
r^Me and k^
N
tex, we may calculate L^
N
ex, as well as minimum cost functions wex(wex
N , wex
M).
Evaluating these with sample values wtex
N and wtex
M we obtain w^ex, which may now be
treated as the wage rate for employment of L^Nex.
7
The first-order condition for employment of Lex leads to our next estimation
equation
ln w^tex ¼  1rx L^tex þ Dtex þ mtex ð2Þ
where inputs Lex with different experience levels x combine in CES fashion with an
elasticity rx to generate an aggregate labor input Le with education level e. Note that we
assume a uniform elasticity rx for all education levels. The term Dtex may be
interpreted as Dex ¼ qte þ lnLte=rx þ lnkex, where qte is the period-t marginal value
productivity of Lte, and kex is the CES share parameter associated with Lex, assumed to
be time-invariant. Imposing the identifying restriction Dtex = dex ? det ? dt, we may
recover k^ex from estimates of the fixed effects dex by complete analogy to k^
N
tex above.
Complementarity between natives and foreign workers within a given
e 9 x-segment of the labor market may be described by d ln wNex ¼
sexs
M
ex=r
x þ sMex 1=rMe  1=rx
  
d ln LMex, where sex is the share of wage payments
6 Borjas (2003) assumes an infinite re
M a priori, while Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008) stress imperfect
substitutability. See also the discussion in Borjas et al. (2008). We don’t take a stance a priori, but let the
data ‘‘speak’’.
7 In this section we synonymously refer to migrants and foreign workers. In the simulation we shall make
a distinction between the pre-existing foreign work force and the new flow of migrants.
4 G. Felbermayr et al.
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for e 9 x-type labor in the cost of Le. This assumes a constant marginal value
product of Le. Notice that—other things equal—a larger employment of Lex
M implies
a lower marginal productivity of Lex. If r e
M [r x, as perhaps expected a priori, and
depending on the wage shares, the complementarity relationship between natives
and migrants may turn into one of substitutability, meaning that a rise in Lex
M leads to
a fall in wex
N . However, there is now an additional complementarity effect that arises
across different experience levels, such that d ln wNex ¼ sMexsex=rx
 
d ln LMex0 [ 0, for
x0 = x, again assuming a constant marginal value productivity of Le.
Using estimates r^x and k^ex, we may now calculate L^te, as well as the
corresponding values of the dual unit-cost functions w^te. Assuming, by analogy to
the above, that labor of different education levels e combine in CES fashion with an
elasticity re to generate an aggregate labor input L, we may write down a final
estimation equation
ln w^te ¼  1re ln L^te þ Dte þ vte ð3Þ
The procedure is now familiar from earlier steps, whereby the identifying
restriction for the fixed effects reads as Dte = dt ? det. The time-fixed effect dt
controls for all time-varying determinants of the marginal value productivity of
aggregate labor L, such as the overall amount of output to be produced, or the
capital-labor ratio.8 The time trend captures education-specific evolutions of the
different CES share parameters kte.
For a constant marginal value productivity of L, within-e 9 x-complementarity
(or substitutability) between natives and immigrants is given by d ln wNex ¼
½sMexsexse=re þ sMexsex 1=rx  1=reð Þ þ sMex 1=rMe  1=rx
 d ln LMex, with an obvious
interpretation of the wage share se. It now becomes obvious that the more we
take into account upper level effects, the lower the degree of complementarity. The
‘‘turning-point’’ between complementarity and substitutability is specific to each
e 9 x-segment. By complete analogy to the above, we may denote complementarity
across education levels according to d ln wNex ¼ sMexsexse=re
 
d ln LMe0x, for e
0 = e.
We close our model of labor demand by assuming that aggregate labor L
combines with a capital stock K to generate a final output. Assuming linear
homogeneity, and normalizing the output price to 1, the marginal productivity of
labor L as well as capital depend only on the capital-to-labor ratio. It is important to
note that in our estimation framework the influence of K/L on the marginal
productivity of L is controlled for by dt, but in the simulation below we separate the
short-run effect from the long-run effect of immigration. In the short run,
immigration will lower K/L, thus depressing the marginal productivity of L. For
Cobb–Douglas technology, this adds a further impact effect of immigration on
ln wNex equal to -(sex
Msexsea )d ln LMex, where a is the share of wage-payments to L. For
the long-run effect, we assume that any increase in L installs an incentive to capital
accumulation, provided that the steady state user cost of capital remains constant.
As the capital stock expands during the adjustment, there will be a positive effect on
ln wNex equal to ad ln K, until capital accumulation restores the initial capital-to-labor
8 More specifically, we have dt ¼ zt þ lnL=re, where zt is the marginal value productivity of L.
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ratio and, thus, the initial marginal value productivity of L. We follow Ottaviano and
Peri (2006, 2008) in assuming that the adjustment to long-run capital stocks takes
place with a rate of 10 percent per annum.
Taking into account all levels of aggregation, native wages relate to employment
changes of various types of labor as follows
d ln wNex ¼
1
re
d ln L þ 1
rx
 1
re
 
d ln Le þ 1rM 
1
rx
 
d ln Lex  1rM d ln L
N
ex ð4Þ
This equation takes a long-run perspective in assuming a constant marginal
productivity of L. An analogous equations holds for d ln wMex, i.e., wages of
foreign workers. Note that the terms d ln Le and d ln L in (4) incorporate cross-
effects from employment of workers with experience levels x0 = x and education
levels e0 = e, as well as cross-effects from employment of foreign workers. For
instance, d ln Lex ¼ sMexd ln LMex þ sNexd ln LNex, and analogously for d ln Le and d ln L.
Armed with estimates of all elasticities of substitution and direct observations of
wage shares sex
M and sex
N , we may use E 9 X 9 2 equations of the form (4) in
order to simulate the wage effects for natives and foreign workers. But wage
effects of what? Immigration is all about a change in labor supply, and not
directly about employment. We need to know how exogenous labor supply
changes lead to endogenous employment changes, which now leads us to wage-
setting.
2.2 Wage-setting and unemployment
In macroeconomic contexts, it has become customary to explain European
unemployment through an interaction of price- and wage-setting; see Layard
et al. (2005). For the present purpose, we employ what Layard et al. (2005) have
called ‘‘normal-cost price-setting’’. Assuming perfect competition on output
markets, prices are equal to marginal cost, and the usual negative price-setting
relationship between the real wage rate and employment (given labor supply) then
derives from the presence of a fixed non-labor input, like the capital stock. In our
context, we thus arrive at price-setting relationships that coincide with the inverse
labor demand functions presented in the preceding section.
In turn, wage-setting is assumed to be responsive to the rate of unemployment.
We define e 9 x-specific rates of unemployment as uex
N := 1 - Lex
N /Nex, and
accordingly for foreign labor (denoted by M), where Mex and Nex denote native and
foreign labor supply of type e 9 x. We stipulate disaggregate wage-setting
equations of the form wNex ¼ wNex 1  uNex
 gN
1  rð Þ1, where wNex is a reference
wage for wage-setting, and r is the replacement rate for the unemployment benefit.9
This translates into the following estimation equation:
ln wNext ¼ gN ln LNext=Next
 þ a ln wNext1 þ jext ð5Þ
9 If this reference wage is set equal to the market clearing wage rate for ex-type labor, and if r = 0, then
the natural rate of unemployment is zero for all types of labor. Of course, theory implies gN [ 0.
6 G. Felbermayr et al.
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where jext is an error term. The lagged wage is added to allow for lagged adjustment,
with a long-run elasticity of gN/(1 - a).10 Estimation of E 9 X 9 2 equations of the
form (5) completes our estimation exercise. Together with estimated Eq. (4), they
allow us to solve for both, equilibrium wage and employment responses to a given
scenario of exogenous changes in immigrant labor supply; see below. We stress that
our framework involves a direct implementation of the price-wage-setting paradigm,
as opposed to estimating a reduced-form relationship between employment and
immigrant labor supply, in lieu of Eq. (5), as for instance in D’Amuri et al. (2009).
Before turning to our simulation, we briefly describe the data and present key
estimation results.
2.3 Data
To estimate the parameters of the simulation model we use micro-level data on
wage rates and labor market status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force), as
well as characteristics such as the education, work experience, and immigrant/
native status. Typically, researchers draw on census data, as in Borjas (2003),
Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007), or social
security data, as in Bonin (2005) and Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008). In contrast, we use
survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Employing year-
specific weights for all relevant individual characteristics, supplied by the DIW
and based on micro-census data, we obtain representative information for the
German economy at large.11
By census standards, our sample size is relatively small, including about 12,000
households and 20,000 persons. However, the GSOEP data offer unique advantages
over social security data, such as the IAB Employment Samples used in D’Amuri
et al. (2009) and Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008). First, it allows to define immigrants as
individuals born outside of Germany. Using nationality as the relevant criterion, as
in social security data, is sensitive to (volatile) naturalization policy.12 Second, the
GSOEP provides information about education attainments in line with the
International Standard Classification of Education adopted by the UNESCO in
1997 (ISCED-97). This allows us to avoid problems that might otherwise arise from
the peculiarities of German educational institutions, such as the apprenticeship
10 Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008) follow a similar procedure. Not shown in (5), we also take into account
education-specific time trends and squared education-specific time trends, to take into account exogenous
long-run changes in reference wages. In the relevant table below, we also report estimates for an
alternative equation with the unemployment rate replacing ln LNext=Next
 
. Equation (5) allows for a more
convenient formulation of the numerical simulation; see below.
11 Manacorda et al. (2006) use a similar strategy in their study for the UK, combining the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) and the General Household Survey (GHS).
12 Official German statistics (and the IAB Employment Samples) define migrants according to
citizenship (ius sanguis principle). Traditionally, naturalization rates have been extremely low in
Germany, so that children of immigrants often do not have the German citizenship. Moreover, the
naturalization law has changed drastically in 1999. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, almost two million ethnic Germans migrated to Germany and—according to ius sanguis rules—
immediately qualified for German citizenship.
Restrictive immigration policy in Germany 7
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system.13 Third, the GSOEP directly reports the experience of workers, and it even
differentiates between experience earned in full-time and part-time jobs. This is a
unique advantage compared to US census data or the IABS, where experience needs
to be approximated by time elapsed since an individual has left school. As this
measure is distorted by possible unemployment spells or maternity leaves, the
literature using census data is usually restricted to male workers; see Borjas (2003).
Our data avoids this restriction. Fourth, and most importantly, the SOEP reports
gross wages on a monthly basis, without the top-censoring that is typical for social
security data and which requires substantial imputation. Using information on
working hours per week, we calculate hourly wages.14
We cluster workers into 16 different groups of education and experience levels.
The four educational groups are defined as follows: ISCED levels 0 through 2
(lower secondary education or second stage of basic education), ISCED level 3
(upper secondary education), ISCED levels 4 and 5 (post-secondary up to first-stage
tertiary education), and ISCED level 6 (second-stage tertiary education). Regarding
experience, we take the sum of observed full-time and part-time experience and use
four categories, each covering a span of 10 years, up to a maximum of 40 years.
Drawing on data from 1984–2005, we have a perfectly balanced sample of 352
observations (704 when differentiating between migrants and natives).
Our time span goes back beyond German unification in 1990. Therefore, we
restrict our observations to the western part of Germany, but treat persons born in
the eastern part as perfect substitutes to natives of the western part. Unfortunately,
available data do not allow us to treat workers from eastern Germany as an
‘‘immigrant’’ category sui generis. D’Amuri et al. (2009) classify persons who have
come from eastern Germany as immigrants, which amounts to treating them as
perfect substitutes to all non-German migrants, but not to natives of western
Germany. Both assumptions seem extreme. We argue that our approach is more
plausible, given the cultural and linguistic similarities between the two parts of
Germany.
2.4 Estimation results
Table 1 presents estimates of the various elasticities of substitution. In our baseline
estimation we instrument labor demand by labor supply. The remaining columns
contain robustness checks. Rows 1 through 5 address the elasticity of substitution
between natives and migrants. For the baseline specification we find 1=r^M ¼ 0:136
with a robust standard error of 0.04, which implies an elasticity value of 7.4. Rows 2
13 For example, the French high school system allows for professional education (the Bac-pro);
individuals enrolled in this system are treated as students. In Germany, a similar educational aim is
achieved outside the high school system through the apprenticeship scheme (or dual education system). If
education is measured by years of schooling, the two systems would assign different values to a student
who achieves the same objective.
14 D’Amuri et al. (2009) provide an in depth comparison of the GSOEP and the IABS. Education
structure of foreigners and natives, as well as average wages, hardly differ between the two data sets. This
comparison indicates that, at least for our purposes, randomness or reliability of the GSOEP do not cause
problems.
8 G. Felbermayr et al.
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through 5 allow for education-specific elasticities r^Me , revealing some variation
across educational branches.15 Our estimates indicate that natives and migrants are
somewhat closer substitutes for each other in Germany than in the US or the UK,
but with an elasticity of substitution well below infinity; for the UK see Manacorda
et al. (2006). This is in line with the results of Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008) and
D’Amuri et al. (2009). By and large, our finding of a fairly large, yet finite elasticity
of substitution r^M also survives the robustness checks reported in Table 1.
Row 6 turns to 1/rx, the elasticity of substitution across experience levels. We are
unable to reject the hypothesis of rx??.16 US studies have found much lower
values of this elasticity, also well below the estimates for rM, as perhaps expected
from intuition.17 Manacorda et al. (2006) obtain r^x [ r^Me for the UK, as we do for
Germany, but with an estimated value for rx clearly below infinity. Large estimates
for rx (in the vicinity of 30) are also reported by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008), whereas
D’Amuri et al. (2009) find an elasticity of only 3, both on German social security
data.
As regards educational groups, our baseline estimate is 1=r^e ¼ 0:218, hence
r^e  4:6. This is somewhat larger than the estimates reported by Borjas (2003),
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007), but in line with
estimates obtained by Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008) for Germany. Columns (2) to (7) of
Table 1 point to a fairly robust picture.
Overall, then, the different types of labor considered here for the German
economy feature a larger degree of substitutability in production than was found for
a similar disaggregation of the US and UK labor markets. Note that our empirical
strategy is consistent with non-Walrasian labor market institutions, as already
emphasized above. Our estimated elasticities of substitution thus reflect the
technological environment, to be combined with the institutional feature of wage-
setting in the simulation below.18
Table 2 reports the estimation results for our wage-setting equation. We have
also run estimations on the employment rate instead of the log-employment ratio.
Our baseline uses pooled regression, with an estimated g-value of 0.08, and a long-
run value g/(1 - a) of 0.55. Our robustness checks show individual-specific effects
using Arellano–Bond, as well as conventional fixed effects that are broadly in line
with Bru¨cker and Jahn (2008).
15 In particular, the top level of education (ISCED 6) exhibits an elasticity in the vicinity of 4, while for
lower levels of education the elasticity is in the vicinity of 10. The large difference between the
elasticities for ISCED 4 ? 5 and ISCED 6 and the insignificant estimate for ISCED 4 ? 5 are probably
due to the fact that ISCED 4 ? 5 mainly contains degrees that are specific to the German educational
system. This means that most foreigners in this group have been educated in Germany.
16 It should be noted that an infinite value of rx is perfectly consistent with more experienced workers
being more productive (in a Harrod-neutral sense) than less experienced ones, thus also receiving higher
wages.
17 Borjas (2003) assumes r M??, and he estimates values rx = 3.5 and re = 1.3, while Ottaviano and
Peri (2006) estimates rM-values between 5 and 10, rx-values between 3 and 5, and re-values around 2.
18 In Felbermayr et al. (2008) we use our parameter estimates to portray a detailed set of elasticities of
complementarity/substitutability between German natives and immigrants.
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3 Simulating transitional immigration restrictions
3.1 The counterfactual scenario
Germany was among the incumbent EU countries who have maintained their
immigration restrictions vis-a`-vis the new members of the two eastern enlargements
of 2004 and 2007. Unlike most others, it has chosen to prolong its restrictions upon
the midterm review. The reason was to avoid negative labor market effects of large
labor inflows from new member countries. Five years on, we can now observe the
inflows received by countries who have abstained from such restrictions, like the
UK. Based on these observations, we should be able to construct a counterfactual
scenario of enlargement-induced immigration that Western Germany19 would have
received, had it abstained from transitional restrictions. Suppose we have rough
estimates of such counterfactual immigration DMex for all of our e 9 x-segments of
the German labor market. Combining these with the parameter estimates in Eqs. (4)
and (5), we may then calculate the wage and employment effects of these inflows, in
order to see whether the fears fuelling the transition agreements seem justified.
In the run-up to EU enlargement, a large number of empirical papers have used
gravity-type models to estimate migration flows from accession countries to
Western Europe, caused by freedom of movement.20 Unfortunately, there is a lot of
heterogeneity in predictions across studies. Moreover, these estimates have mostly
been focusing on the aggregate migration potential. For our simulation exercise, we
require information on the education 9 experience profile of the worker inflow. We
Table 2 Parameter estimates—German wage curve
Short run Long run
Pooled OLS
Employment ratio 0.084 (0.043) 0.550 (0.144)
Unemployment rate -0.108 (0.052) -0.703 (0.180)
Lagged wage 0.839 (0.045) 0.839 (0.045)
Arellano–Bond/Random-effects estimatora
Employment ratio 0.004 (0.044) 0.137 (0.053)
Unemployment rate -0.014 (0.050) -0.186 (0.067)
Lagged wage 0.336 (0.050) 0.336 (0.050)
Fixed-effects estimator
Employment ratio 0.105 (0.051)
Unemployment rate -0.143 (0.064)
Loglinear specification (except unemployment rate); dependent variable: wage rate. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in education-experience-nation groups. All regressions include
education-specific time trends. Number of observations: 672
a Short run: Arellano–Bond, long-run: random-effects estimator
19 All numbers in the following refer to Western Germany; over 90% of the immigrant population in
Germany lives in Western Germany.
20 See Baas and Bru¨cker (2008) and Zaiceva (2006) for overviews of this literature.
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draw on migration from new EU member countries to the UK observed subsequent
to EU enlargement in 2004, in order to obtain such estimates. The UK is by far the
largest of the countries that have lifted all restrictions immediately upon
enlargement.21 The migration flow from new member countries has turned out to
be larger than expected; see Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009). Given the
importance of geographical factors for observed migration patterns, as documented
in Zaiceva (2006), it seems reasonable to assume that the migrants that have actually
sought work in the UK would have gone to Germany, had they been allowed to do
so. We thus take the size and the composition of the UK inflow from Eastern Europe
as the guideline for our counterfactual German immigration scenario. Needless to
say that this is but a rough approximation. Indeed, in view of the gravity forces and
cultural ties, this guideline most likely leads to a lower bound estimate of the inflow
that Germany would have received with an immediate freedom of movement upon
enlargement.
We use the British Labour force surveys (LFS) for the fourth quarters of 2003
and 200622 to calculate the inflow of Eastern European workers into the relevant
education 9 experience cells in the UK.23 Based on observations of 2003 for
the total population, we calculate the yearly percentage increases in the various
cells. Using the overall population size in the corresponding cells from the
GSOEP for 2005, we then calculate counterfactual immigration numbers for
Germany.
Table 3 gives an overview of our counterfactual scenario. Panel A gives end-of-
sample (2005) status quo numbers. Panel B reports the absolute numbers DMex and
the associated percentage increases that we have calculated following the procedure
outlined above. Our baseline scenario holds that the total inflow would amount to
just under 700,000 additional workers. Notice that this must be interpreted as inflow
of full-time workers. The total inflow would be much larger, as it also includes
persons who are outside the labor force. The number of 700,000 is roughly
consistent with the forecast of immigration flows to be found in the literature for a
time span of 5–10 years.24 Panel C translates the flow into percentage increases of
the entire size of the various labor force cells. The first column for each experience
level gives D(Mex ? Nex)/(Mex ? Nex).
Our scenario comes in four different versions: (i) A baseline-scenario, which
takes the numbers detailed in Table 3. (ii) A ‘‘high immigration’’ scenario, where
we double the total inflow, but keep the composition in line with Table 3. This
21 Sweden and Ireland have granted free mobility too, but have received migrant flows that are smaller by
at least one order of magnitude.
22 Office for National Statistics (2006, 2007a).
23 Education levels (ISCED) are derived according to the LFS Users Guide (Office for National Statistics
2007b). The distinction between ISCED 5 and 6 differs from the one in the GSOEP. As ISCED 4 ? 5 are
mainly specific German degrees, we assume that all persons with ISCED 4–6 have ISCED 6. Experience
is calculated as age -16 for ISCED 0–2, age -19 for ISCED 3 and age -22 for ISCED 4–6. Moreover,
we replace negative changes in the highest experience group by zero, as this probably reflects a mere
cohort effect.
24 See for instance Zaiceva (2006). Our estimate of 700,000 additional immigrants seems plausible but is
of course based on strong assumptions. Sinn et al. (2001) have predicted an inflow of 3 million within
10 years.
12 G. Felbermayr et al.
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reflects our interpretation of the baseline scenario as a lower bound, as argued
above. (iii) A ‘‘high education’’ scenario which assumes that the composition of the
inflow equals the one observed for Eastern Europeans in Canada between 1995 and
2000.25 Finally, (iv) we run a ‘‘low education’’ scenario which sets the composition
of the inflow equal to the one observed for all immigrants from the accession
countries in Germany in 2005.26
For all scenarios, we report short-run and long-run effects. We assume that the
total inflow occurs over a time span of 7 years. This is equal to the maximum
duration of transitional restrictions allowed for by the agreements. Our short run
assumes partial adjustment of the capital stock. More specifically, we assume that in
each of these 7 years, the gap between the capital stock and its steady state level is
narrowed by 10%, whereby investors take the stock of immigrants achieved as
permanent. Our short run looks a the position that the economy thus reaches after
the initial 7 years envisaged by the transitional agreements. The long run then
assumes that the capital intensity has returned to its steady state level. Also, in all
scenarios we contrast wage effects when labor markets are Walrasian to a situation
where, due to wage-setting institutions, they are not.
3.2 Wages and employment
Table 4 summarizes the simulation results. To save space we aggregate to high- and
low-skilled labor, the latter being defined as ISCED 0–3. The underlying bottom-
level elasticity estimates (see Table 1) are as follows: r1
M = 9, r2
M = 8.9,
r3
M = 10.6, and r4
M = 4.3. The elasticity of substitution across experience levels
has been set to r x = 100,27 while the elasticity of substitution across educational
branches is re = 4.6. For wage-setting (see Table 2), we use g = 0.08 for the short
run and g/(1 - a) = 0.14 for the long run. The first two columns repeat the relevant
shocks (see Table 3).
First, turning to the baseline scenario with perfect labor markets, we find negative
short-run wage effects for both foreigners and natives. On average, the wage of
foreigners would decrease by 2.1% and that of natives by 0.5%—wage cuts that are
substantial, but surely not extreme. Indeed, keeping in mind that the assumed
migrant inflow equals 14% of the foreign labor force in Germany and 2% of the
native labor force, our simulated wage effects seem rather modest. Assuming
perfect capital adjustment the results are much more favorable. We still observe a
negative effect on the wages of foreigners, but the average wage cut is now only
1.5%. For native wages, we obtain an increase of 0.2%.
Allowing for unemployment due to non-Walrasian wage-setting, the signs of the
wage effects are the same, but the effects become much smaller. With imperfect
capital adjustment the average wage of foreigners decreases by 0.6%, while for
25 Data come from the OECD-DIOC Database (OECD 2008). It is further assumed that the distribution
over experience levels and the overall number of immigrants equal the ones in the baseline scenario.
26 The experience structure is treated similarly. Data are from the GSOEP.
27 This takes account of the fact that our estimation results do not allow us to reject rx !1, while
retaining computability of the model.
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natives the cut now a mere 0.03%. With perfect capital adjustment, we find a wage
reduction of 0.7% for foreigners, and an increase of 0.06% for natives. It is
remarkable that the negative effect is stronger with perfect capital adjustment than
with imperfect adjustment. This is due to a stronger effect of immigration on
employment with perfect capital adjustment; the increase in supply of foreign labor
of 13.6% increases the number of employed foreigners by 5.5% with imperfect
adjustment, and by 8.0% with perfect adjustment. The relatively weak link of labor
supply to employment implies a strong increase in the unemployment rate of
foreigners; with imperfect capital adjustment the unemployment rate goes up by 5.6
percentage points and with perfect adjustment it increases by 3.9 percentage points.
The effect on native employment is modest. With imperfect capital adjustment the
unemployment rate of natives increases by 0.3 percentage points and with perfect
adjustment actually decreases by 0.5 percentage points. Altogether, our simulation
results indicate that the transitional restrictions have a strong positive effect on
incumbent foreign workers. Their effect on native workers, however, is less clear-
cut. In the short run, with incomplete capital adjustment, additional immigration has
a negative effect also on native workers. However, once capital has adjusted to
restore the initial real rate of return, native workers gain from additional
immigration.
Looking at the ‘‘high immigration’’ scenario, we find the same pattern of effects
as in the baseline scenario, but the numbers are of course larger. From this scenario,
two main results of our simulation exercise become obvious: First, immigration to
Germany can have a strong effect on employment or unemployment, respectively,
but its effect on wages is not substantial. On the one hand, an average decrease in
foreign wages of less than 1.5% following an increase of the foreign workforce by
27% is very modest. Even the decrease of 4.2% under the assumption of perfect
labor markets and imperfect capital adjustment is not overly large. On the other
hand, the unemployment rate of foreigners is quite sensitive, increasing by as much
as 10 percentage points in the short run, and by 6.9 percentage points in the long
run. To some degree this large employment effect could be due to our model setup
(especially the uniform parameter g). However, it is commonly believed that
collective labor agreements in Germany magnify the employment effects of labor
supply shocks and minimize wage cuts, and that foreigners are likely to be outsiders
to the wage-setting process. Hence, foreigners are the main group that would be
negatively affected by a more liberal immigration regime.
Our ‘‘high education’’ scenario delivers interesting results. As one would expect,
high-skilled employment and wages are more strongly affected, and low-skilled
employment and wages are less strongly affected than in the baseline scenario. This
holds true for foreigners as well as for natives. However, it is remarkable that fewer
immigrants find employment than in the baseline scenario, although the overall
number of immigrants is the same. Foreign employment increases by 4.6% with
imperfect capital adjustment, and by 7.0% with perfect adjustment, whereas in the
baseline scenario it increases by 5.5 and 8.0%, respectively. In addition, wages of
foreign workers decrease by more than in the baseline scenario. With perfect capital
adjustment, the effect is now -0.91%, compared to -0.74% in the baseline
scenario. The effects on native wages and employment do not differ from the
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baseline scenario. Nevertheless, these results do not necessarily mean that low-
skilled immigration is better for Germany than high-skilled immigration, as the
latter may have beneficial effects that lie beyond our setup (e.g., on total factor
productivity). The ‘‘low education’’ scenario delivers wage and employment effects
for foreigners that hardly differ from the baseline scenario. However, the effect on
native unemployment is clearly worse than in the baseline scenario, with ?0.37%
under imperfect capital adjustment, and -0.42% with perfect capital adjustment.28
3.3 Overall welfare effect of transitional restrictions
The wage and unemployment effects from this immigration counterfactual may be
seen as the gains and pains that the German economy was spared through opting for
transitional immigration restrictions in eastern EU enlargement. Our simulation
results enable us to calculate the welfare effects from the counterfactual immigration
scenario. With perfect labor markets, the welfare effects for native labor may be
approximated by NDwN, where N and wN denote vectors of native labor supply and
wages, respectively, for our 16 different types of education and experience levels,
and a dot () denotes a scalar product.29 With labor market imperfections leading to
changes in native employment, the welfare effect for native labor must take into
account employment effects, in addition to changes in wages. The relevant welfare
measure for natives generalizes to LNDwN ? wNDLN. For the pre-existing stock of
foreign workers the effect is LMDwM þ wM  D~LM  D ~M
 
, where D~L
M
denotes the
general equilibrium effect of immigration on employment of foreign workers.
Table 5 presents such welfare calculations for the wage-setting case with
unemployment and perfect capital adjustment. We add the percentage effect on
capital income to complete the picture. Gains for capital owners are calculated
according to ð1  aÞD lnL, from the Cobb–Douglas marginal productivity condition.
This is a lower bound, because it ignores the triangular gain deriving from capital
accumulation. At the same time, however, it ignores discounting which works in the
other direction. In the baseline scenario the native labor force gains from migration,
whereas the foreign labor force suffers. The welfare effect for the total labor force is
negative. However, considering the positive effect on capital holders, the overall
welfare effect of immigration is positive; assuming a labor income share of 0.7, the
overall welfare effect is ?0.09%.
In the ‘‘high immigration’’ scenario the overall effect is even more favorable.
This is due to the fact that, relative to the gains of natives, the losses of (incumbent)
foreigners are less than proportionally higher, as the negative employment effects
are partly borne by the immigrants themselves. In the ‘‘high education’’ scenario,
and assuming a labor income share of 0.7, we obtain a negative welfare effect of
-0.02%. This would indicate that imposing transitional labor market restrictions
28 When interpreting the numbers from the ‘‘low education’’ scenario in Table 4, one has to bear in mind
that the number of persons with ISCED 0–2 is much larger, and the number of persons with ISCED 3 is
much smaller than in the baseline scenario. Indeed, the number of persons with an education level higher
than ISCED 3 is higher in the low education scenario.
29 See Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) for a detailed welfare analysis.
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was welfare enhancing for the German population as a whole. However, we believe
that the baseline scenario is much more likely than the ‘‘high education’’ scenario.
And this means that, at least in the long run, or with perfect capital adjustment, the
German population has suffered a welfare loss from the transitional restrictions. It is
remarkable that the only population group who is better off due to the restriction are
incumbent foreigners.
4 Conclusions
Our simulation results clearly indicate that German factor owners as a whole, and
particularly native workers, are unlikely to profit from the transitional restrictions
that limit the inflow of migrants from the new EU member states. In the long run,
the detrimental effects are most pronounced. Thus, the decision to impose
transitional restrictions on immigration from the new EU countries does not appear
like a welfare-improving policy. Indeed, it may well have harmed the German
population as a whole. In the short run, the effect may be positive,30 thus potentially
justifying the restrictions. However, the only group that appears to benefit
consistently are incumbent foreigner workers. This group is unlikely to be pivotal
for the political economy process behind the setting of immigration policy. Hence,
our conclusion is that it is very hard to rationalize the use of transitional agreements,
based on purely economic grounds.
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